


Beit Midrash YeshivahAI

In the series

Daily Tanya Explorations

Perception and Creation in Atzilut

What Moses perceived and what spiritual derivation can produce



Reader edition · Revised edition 1.5

ו' תשרי תשפ"ז

Human direction · Beit Midrash rabbinic supervision

A word of introduction — two questions in one passage

This booklet studies **the opening of Epistle 20 in Iggeret HaKodesh, a section of Tanya**. Tanya is the foundational work of Chabad Chassidism, written by Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi, known as the Alter Rebbe. Chassidic teaching explains the relationship between G-d, the human being, and the world, and the inner meaning of serving G-d. Iggeret HaKodesh is one of Tanya's sections. We will explain its place in the book and what makes Epistle 20 distinctive. We begin with two questions raised by its opening passage, building the concepts step by step.

The first question presents a sharp apparent contradiction about the very same subject. The epistle discusses the sefirot—modes of Divine revelation and influence—and their vessels, the aspects that give revelation its particular form. It says that these vessels are not “in the category of an existent entity and an apprehensible essence”: what they are cannot be grasped. It immediately mentions Moses' apprehension in Netzach, one of those very sefirot! Moreover, Epistle 19 says that Moses apprehended **the inward dimension of the sefirot themselves**: Netzach, Hod, Yesod, and Malchut—the four lower sefirot in the system. On one side, an apprehensible essence is denied of them; on the other, inward apprehension within them is affirmed. **How can both statements stand together?**

The difficulty is more specific than the general question of how a human being can know Divinity. It concerns the very sefirot to which the denial applies, and their inward dimension that Moses did apprehend. Saying that Moses reached a lower level, or that he did not apprehend everything, is therefore insufficient: Netzach is still one of the sefirot, and his attainment is described as inward. At the same time, we must not assume that “inwardness” and “essence” mean the same thing. Establishing their relationship is part of the question.

The second question concerns a surprising example. After discussing the sefirot of Atzilut, which are Divine, the epistle speaks about angels and an animal's soul, which are created beings. How can an example from such a different level explain the preceding discussion? Our questions therefore concern two matters: what can be known and apprehended, and how something can come into being. We will explain both without assuming prior knowledge of Kabbalah or Chassidism, while preserving the force of the difficulty.

It helps to know from the outset where our study will lead. The question about the example of angels has a well-supported explanation within the argument of the epistle. For the question about Moses' perception, we have found a plausible approach supported by sources, but a connection within that approach still needs to be proved. It would be wrong to present the two questions as equally resolved.

The YeshivahAI Beit Midrash uses artificial intelligence to locate sources, compare them, and subject explanations to criticism, under human direction and within the Beit Midrash's framework of rabbinic supervision. Different systems propose explanations, challenge them, and help sharpen the inquiry. These tools do not replace the sources or human judgment, and agreement among them is not proof.

This is one of two companion booklets. The present volume explains the essentials; the **Research Edition** also preserves the full range of proposed explanations, criticisms, and investigations. Both appear in Hebrew and in full English translation.

Translation note: English renderings of primary-source passages in this booklet are our own translations. They are not quotations from the published English Lessons in Tanya.

A preview — ten distinctions we will encounter

- 1. “Light” and “vessel” are terms for divine revelation, not physical light and a physical object.
- 2. The “worlds” of Kabbalah are not geographical places.
- 3. Netzach, the level named in connection with Moses’ perception, is itself one of the sefirot of Atzilut.
- 4. Pnimityut, “inwardness,” and panim, “face,” do not necessarily mean the same thing in every context.
- 5. Being lower than Chochmah does not place a level outside the category of vessels.
- 6. The self-nullification of the person perceiving does not, by itself, prove that no essence was perceived.
- 7. We must distinguish a development proceeding from a source from creation yesh me’ayin, “something from nothing.”
- 8. The example of angels examines a way of coming into being; it does not equate different spiritual levels.
- 9. “Something from nothing” in this epistle concerns more than the appearance of physical matter.
- 10. We can reach a real understanding while leaving a clearly defined difficulty unresolved.

Reading map

First we will learn the language of the epistle. Then we will set out the two questions from the text itself, examine Moses’ perception, turn to the example of angels, and finally distinguish what we can say with confidence from what still needs explanation. The eight central sources are collected at the end.

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1 • Learning the language of the epistle

We can now place the passage within the book. **Iggeret HaKodesh** is the fourth section of Tanya. It contains thirty-two epistles on faith, Torah, and Divine service. **Kuntres Acharon** follows as a separate section. **Epistle 20** is a wide-ranging, deeply reasoned letter. It opens with words from the Zohar about the unity of G-d with the lights and vessels of the sefirot in Atzilut. We will explain these terms shortly.¹

What makes Epistle 20 distinctive?

Its place is special both in the history of its writing and in its content. Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Lubavitch, known as **the Tzemach Tzedek**, the Alter Rebbe's grandson and the third Rebbe of Chabad, records that it was written in the village of Piena in the days before the Alter Rebbe's passing. The epistle develops a fundamental account of the unity of the sefirot with Ein Sof, the power to create something from nothing, and the coming into being of the physical world. Its Kabbalistic terms form part of an explanation; each has a role to play.²

This discussion also leads back to everyday life. At the end of the epistle, the Alter Rebbe explains the value of **practical mitzvot**—serving G-d through the body and physical objects, such as putting on tefillin and giving charity. Understanding the source of creation deepens our understanding of these deeds. This booklet focuses on two questions from the opening, but we should keep the whole epistle's destination in view: its profound inquiry leads to action.

1. Tanya, Iggeret HaKodesh 20, the opening: “Ihu vechayohi chad”—“He and His lights are one.” The parenthetical explanation identifies the lights and vessels of the ten sefirot of Atzilut.

2. The time of writing is reported in the name of the Tzemach Tzedek, Derech Mitzvotecha 170a, in the Rebbe's discourse “Shelach Lecha Anashim,” 5734, section 2, and in the introduction to Shiurim BeSefer HaTanya, Epistle 20. For the thirty-two epistles and Kuntres Acharon as a separate section, see the Chayei Sarah talk, 5726, section 9. The digital texts quoting the testimony were read; a scan of Derech Mitzvotecha was not inspected.

The terms we need for our reading

What does **Ein Sof**, “without end,” mean? It does not mean something so large that we cannot measure it. Here the term points to Divinity unrestricted by the limitations that define created beings. We should therefore not picture it as an object with size, shape, or location—not even an extraordinarily vast object. The difficulty raised at the start of the epistle is how that which is unlimited can be united with vessels that have limits and definition.

The **sefirot** are distinguishable ways in which Divinity is revealed. Chochmah, Binah, and Chesed—wisdom, understanding, and kindness, for example—are not interchangeable names. They name different aspects. They are not parts out of which Divinity is assembled, nor does their existence imply ten gods or ten independent powers. The epistle asks precisely how these distinctions exist within divine unity. In each sefirah we speak of a **light** and a **vessel**. The light is the divine revelation; the vessel gives that revelation the particular character of the sefirah. As a cautious starting point, we might think of an idea and the way it is expressed: a content can take a definite form, and the form is not identical with the content itself. This is only an initial aid to understanding the two roles. The vessels of Atzilut are not external containers standing apart from Divinity, and the light is not a physical ray entering them. This distinction matters to our question. If a vessel were a separate object, it would be easy to understand how it could have definition. But the epistle emphasizes that the vessels of Atzilut are Divinity. On the one hand, they have limitation and distinction; on the other, they have no independence in relation to the Emanator—G-d, from whom they emanate.

The word **world** also needs explaining. The four names **Atzilut**, **Beriah**, **Yetzirah**, and **Asiyah** describe orders of revelation and concealment, not four regions in space. The Hebrew abbreviation **BiYA** refers to the last three. For our purposes, the

fundamental distinction is that the sefirot of Atzilut are described as Divinity, while the discussion of BiYA also concerns created existence. When one level is said to be “higher” than another, this means its spiritual standing, not its distance from the ground.³

The angels mentioned here are not human beings with wings. In Tanya’s account, they are spiritual created beings. Chapter 39 places the abode of angels in the world of Yetzirah, while an accompanying note also mentions higher angels in the world of Beriah. This already makes the question understandable: created angels are not the same as the sefirot of Atzilut.⁴

One more term is needed before we read the passage: **beli mah**, “without what.” The epistle uses it to say that the sefirot are not “in the category of an existent entity and an apprehensible essence.” An **essence** is what a thing is, as distinct from a general awareness that it exists. The epistle is not merely saying that the vessels are difficult for us to understand; it connects the denial of an apprehensible essence with their divine status. Exactly how to understand this denial alongside Moses’ prophecy is the heart of our inquiry, not a definition that already settles it.

2 • Reading the two questions in the source

The beginning of the epistle explains that the vessels are united with Ein Sof with regard to creation of something from nothing. This does not mean that they acquire an independent creative power: the coming into being takes place through the power of Ein Sof and by means of the vessels. Nor should we conclude that their unity consists entirely of participation in a common act; the epistle continues to discuss the Divinity of the vessels and their unity with their source.⁵

3. Epistle 20, the opening and the later discussion of “the beginning of created existence.” This booklet limits its explanation to the distinction needed here; it does not offer a complete description of the four worlds.

4. Tanya, Part 1, Chapter 39, the paragraph on the abode of angels and the accompanying note on the higher angels in the world of Beriah.

5. Shiurim BeSefer HaTanya, Epistle 20, the explanation and the addition marked as the Rebbe’s concerning the act of creation through the vessels. These should be read alongside the epistle’s subsequent discussion of their Divinity and unity.

It then discusses **hishtalshelut through ilah ve'alul**, a development proceeding from cause to effect. An **ilah** is the source from which something proceeds; the **alul** is what proceeds from it. The word **hishtalshelut** evokes a chain: one link follows from the preceding link, and the two are connected. This does not mean that they are identical, but that the result is related to its source in the manner described here as **ilah ve'alul**. The epistle says that the development discussed by the Ramak—Rabbi Moshe Cordovero, one of the great Kabbalists of Safed—concerns the sefirot within the sefirot themselves, specifically their vessels. It immediately says of the sefirot:

“They are called **beli mah** ... for they are not in the category of an existent entity and an apprehensible essence ... as it is written: ‘My face shall not be seen.’”

It then mentions Moses’ prophecy:

“His apprehension was from the upper section of Netzach of Ze’ir Anpin.”

Ze’ir Anpin names the structure of the six sefirot from Chesed through Yesod; we explain this in chapter 4. Omissions in these excerpts are explicitly marked. The complete passage appears in the Research Edition and in the source.⁶

The apparent contradiction now returns in full force: both the denial and the positive apprehension concern the sefirot themselves. Netzach is one of them, not an exception outside them. Moreover, Epistle 19 says that Moses apprehended **the pnimiyut of NeHYM**. Pnimiyut means inwardness or an inner aspect; **NeHYM** is a Hebrew abbreviation for Netzach, Hod, Yesod, and Malchut. If the inner aspect of these levels can be apprehended, how are the vessels as a whole included in the denial of an “apprehensible essence”? The question does not assume that the vessel is independent. It asks about the vessel as it is united with Divinity.

6. Epistle 20, from “What the Ramak wrote” to “the animal’s spirit from the Face of the Ox.” The quotations in the text are selected excerpts from this continuous passage.

The epistle next states that even very many **tzimtzumim**, or contractions—here, limitations and concealments within spiritual revelation—cannot bring about the development of a dense physical body, like earth, from spirituality. We will explain these contractions in chapter 5. It mentions **separate intelligences**: intellectual beings that are not intellect embodied in a physical body, including angels. What can proceed through the process under discussion is **the animal’s spirit from the Face of the Ox**.

The **Face of the Ox** names an aspect of the heavenly Chariot described in Ezekiel’s prophecy. It does not mean a physical ox in a higher location. In the Chassidic example, this aspect is the source from which an animal’s soul—its spiritual vitality—is drawn. In the example discussed here, this is a derivation within created spirituality. **The animal’s spirit is not the animal’s body**: this is the distinction on which the answer will rest.⁷

The second question is now clear. Why take an example from the realm of created beings for a discussion that began with the divine vessels of Atzilut? The fact that both subjects are “spiritual” does not make them equivalent. To answer, we need to establish exactly what the example is meant to show.

3 · What Moses perceived—and why a quick answer is insufficient

Apprehension, or *hasagah*, means grasping or knowing something, but not all forms of knowing are alike. A person can know about something, understand its qualities, or experience its revelation. Epistle 19 distinguishes a sage’s wisdom from prophecy, which it describes as actual seeing and revelation. This is not ordinary eyesight; the emphasis is that a prophet

⁷ Epistle 20, the end of the passage under discussion; Torah Or, Megillat Esther, “Yavi’u Levush Malchut” and its explanation, the discussion of animals’ souls and bodies. This reference was offered as an example of the “elsewhere” mentioned in the epistle, not as its exclusive identification.

receives a revelation rather than only arriving at a conclusion through thought.⁸

This distinction is useful, but it does not solve the difficulty by itself. We cannot simply say that the denial concerns thought, whereas Moses prophesied. Epistle 20 itself connects the denial with the verse about seeing and with Moses' apprehension. We therefore need to understand **what was revealed** and what remained beyond apprehension, not merely which faculty was involved.

Epistle 19 uses the terms **panim and achorayim**, “face” and “back.” These are not bodily parts. There, panim describes the sefirah as it is united with its Emanator; achorayim describes the aspects that can descend and extend to lower levels. “Descent” means the possibility of revelation and influence reaching a recipient, not movement through space.

At first, then, the answer seems simple: Moses perceived achorayim, not panim. But the epistle says more than that. The achorayim of Chochmah are clothed within further levels—that is, the revelation reaches the recipient through those levels—and when they reach NeHYM, Moses apprehends an inner aspect. Knowing that the revelation carries the achorayim of Chochmah does not itself tell us that the pnimiyut of Netzach was not apprehended. And when Epistle 20 denies an apprehensible essence to the vessels, Netzach is included.⁹

The same difficulty remains if we say only that Moses reached a level lower than Chochmah. One may know a little or a great deal, something lower or something higher; in each case, one can still ask whether what became known was the thing's essence. The height of the level and the way it is apprehended are two different issues.

⁸. Tanya, Iggeret HaKodesh 19, the distinction between the apprehension of the sages of the inner wisdom of Torah and prophecy, which is called seeing.

⁹. Epistle 19, the opening and the description of the pnimiyut of NeHYM; the definition of panim and achorayim appears later. “The achorayim of Chochmah” should not be replaced by the claim that only the achorayim of every sefirah mentioned were apprehended.

What, then, have we learned from Epistle 19? The epistle itself connects apprehension of the pnimiyut of NeHYM with the verse speaking of achorayim. We should therefore not read the word pnimiyut as though it always meant the same as panim in that verse. An aspect may be inward relative to a particular level and yet not be the aspect excluded by the words “My face shall not be seen.” This gives us grounds for examining the proposed approach. We still need to show how it applies specifically to the denial of an “apprehensible essence.”

4 • A revelation that remains beli mah

Here we find help in **Chana Ariel**, by Rabbi Yitzchak Aizik of Homil, a disciple of the Alter Rebbe and a profound exponent of Chabad thought. In a discourse for the Torah portion Behaalotecha, he describes Moses’ prophecy from the upper section of Netzach, and his seeing the partzuf of NeHY—Netzach, Hod, and Yesod—“שהוא ג”כ בלי מה”—“which is also beli mah.”¹⁰

In Kabbalah, a **partzuf** is an ordered structure of interconnected sefirot, not a human face. **Ze’ir Anpin**, abbreviated **Za**, names the structure of the six sefirot from Chesed through Yesod; Netzach is one of them. Malchut, the final component of the abbreviation NeHYM, is an additional sefirah discussed alongside Netzach, Hod, and Yesod as a means of conveying influence. An **outer partzuf** is an aspect within this structure. The **upper section of Netzach** identifies a particular aspect within Netzach—not all of Netzach, and not something outside the sefirot. We do not need to know the entire arrangement to understand the problem: this particular aspect, too, belongs to Atzilut.

Chana Ariel is significant because it keeps both sides of the discussion together: Moses received a revelation, and what was revealed is still called beli mah. In a discourse for the Torah portion Naso, it describes Moses’ perception as a

¹⁰. Chana Ariel, Behaalotecha, “Veha’asafsuf,” the section on Moses and the paragraph beginning “What is written, ‘You shall see.’” The wording was checked in a digital transcription; no claim of verification against a printed edition is made here.

”תמונה דבלי מה דכלים דאצילות”—an “image of the beli mah of the vessels of Atzilut.” “Image” here does not mean a photograph or a physical figure. The expression describes the manner of prophetic revelation.¹¹

The Behaalotecha discourse also describes Moses’ **bitul**, or self-nullification. Bitul does not mean erasing the person or losing consciousness. Here it means that Moses does not stand before the revelation as a separate, independent entity. The author connects this way of receiving with revelation within a vessel of Atzilut. We can thus understand why the existence of a revelation need not mean that what is revealed has become something separate from Divinity.

But at this point we must pause rather than pass over the difficulty. The question did not assume something separate from Divinity; it concerned apprehension of a vessel united with Divinity. **Lack of independence and lack of apprehension of essence are not the same statement.** Even when the recipient is in a state of bitul, we still need to explain what was apprehended and in what sense it is not the essence whose apprehension was denied.

There is also a limit to what can be claimed from Epistle 19. It does not say that only the light clothed within NeHYM was apprehended, rather than NeHYM themselves. It describes NeHYM as being revealed, and then describes the light within them. An explanation that entirely excludes the vessels from the revelation cannot therefore rest on this wording alone.¹²

The proposed approach distinguishes an inward revelation at a particular level from apprehension of the essence denied in Epistle 20. Epistle 19 and Chana Ariel give real grounds for making this distinction. **What is missing is proof that apprehension of the pnimiyut of NeHYM really differs from the apprehension of essence that the epistle denies.** We do not

11. Chana Ariel, Naso, “Veyishalchu Min HaMachaneh,” the paragraph on the image of beli mah and the upper section of Netzach.

12. Epistle 19, the paragraph describing NeHYM as the vessels that convey influence and as aspects revealed to the prophets, with the light of Binah and the achorayim of Chochmah within them.

necessarily need a source that states our question in identical words; a demonstrable interpretation could also establish the connection. In the sources examined, that connection has not yet been established.

5 · Spirit from spirit, but not body from spirit

We can now return to the second question. To understand it, we need to be precise about **tzimtzum**, “contraction.” In our context it describes limitation and concealment within spiritual revelation. We do not have to maintain that every tzimtzum is merely a quantitative change. The epistle says that even a great many contractions do not explain how a physical body could develop from spirituality through hishtalshelut.¹³

An idea that awakens a feeling can help illustrate something proceeding from a source. A person understands a friend’s distress, and that understanding awakens a desire to help. The intellect and the feeling are different, yet we can trace the connection: this particular understanding awakened this particular feeling. This is a limited analogy for a relationship between source and result, not proof about the higher worlds or a complete account of ilah ve’alul.

Yesh me’ayin, “something from nothing,” by contrast, is not a straightforward continuation of what is already present in the source. It does not mean that there is no Creator or no source. Rather, the coming into being of the existent thing cannot be explained as a development from a cause comparable to it—a source related to the result through the kind of derivation just described. In the epistle, this creation is attributed to the power of Ein Sof. The term names a different way of coming into being, not merely an exceptionally large change within the same process.

¹³. Epistle 20, “Even very many contractions.” Pardes Rimonim 6:3 discusses the effect being encompassed by its cause; 6:6 includes the analogy of a spark of the sun united with the sun, in the context of the unity of the essence with its source.

The example of angels addresses exactly this point. The discussion began with the vessels of Atzilut, but it goes on to examine the power of hishtalshelut even when we are already dealing with created spirituality. An angel therefore does not have to be equal in level to a sefirah. The example needs to show what can, and what cannot, be explained through the process under discussion.

The animal's spirit deriving from the Face of the Ox is the positive example: a derivation within the realm of spirituality. The animal's body is what that process does not explain. In **Torah Or**, a collection of the Alter Rebbe's Chassidic discourses, the distinction between the animal's soul and its body appears in the explanation of "Yavi'u Levush Malchut," "Let them bring a royal garment." The comparison does not identify two things at the same level; it distinguishes two kinds of coming into being.¹⁴

There is consequently no need to say that angels are the final spiritual link before matter. That claim is unnecessary and is not made here. Nor do we need a **kal vachomer**, an argument from a lesser case to a greater one. Such an argument would require the premise that a lower level is better able to produce matter through hishtalshelut. The passage can be understood without that premise.

In **Shiurim BeSefer HaTanya**, Rabbi Yosef Wineberg's commentary, a note by the Rebbe clarifies the phrase "even ... of the angels." The commentary then explains that even when angels are described in terms of matter and form, these remain spiritual rather than physical matter such as earth. The Rebbe's short note must be distinguished from the commentator's fuller explanation. Both, however, help us read the passage without turning angels into a separate class added after the separate intelligences.¹⁵

¹⁴. Torah Or, "Yavi'u Levush Malchut" and its explanation; an additional transcription. The discussion of the animal's soul and body directly assists in understanding the example.

¹⁵. Shiurim BeSefer HaTanya, Epistle 20, the addition "even [from separate intelligences] of the angels," and the adjacent explanation of spiritual matter and form. The fuller explanation about the matter of angels is the commentator's.

This is an inquiry within the language of Kabbalah and Chassidic thought. The animal's soul deriving from the Face of the Ox is not presented in this booklet as the result of a physics experiment, and the analogy of intellect and feeling is not empirical evidence for the claim. Our question is how to understand the argument and the sources on which it rests.

6 • What has become clear, and what remains to be studied

The explanation of the second question does not restrict the epistle to the creation of bodies. Later it also mentions spiritual created existence, the vessels of the sefirot in BiYA, and the lights called nefesh and ruach—names for levels of spiritual vitality. “Spiritual” is therefore not synonymous with “emanated through hishtalshelut.” In each case, we must distinguish what kind of thing it is from the way it comes into being.¹⁶

We can now follow the passage's sequence. The epistle distinguishes creation through the power of Ein Sof from hishtalshelut; it identifies the scope of the Ramak's discussion of the sefirot; and it then explains that many contractions within spirituality do not account for the appearance of a body. The example of angels is not a digression, but a further examination of the limit of hishtalshelut. **This provides a well-supported answer to the second question.**¹⁷

For the first question, we have learned to distinguish pnimiyut from panim, the level of revelation from the way it is received, and bitul from denial of apprehension of essence. These terms cannot simply replace one another. **A plausible approach remains, and the precise difficulty remains open:** how does apprehension of the pnimiyut of NeHYM fit with the denial of an apprehensible essence to the vessels of Atzilut?

¹⁶. Epistle 20, the continuation beginning “Now the beginning of created existence.” The lights called nefesh and ruach mentioned there should not be equated with every use of the word ruach, “spirit,” without further examination.

¹⁷. The account of the argument's structure is the conclusion of our reading of the epistle and the accompanying sources. Even when an explanation is well supported, the editor's precise formulation should not be attributed to the Rebbe or the Alter Rebbe.

That qualification is part of the finding. What is missing is not merely a reference: we still need to prove why apprehension of the pnimiyut of NeHYM does not fall within the essence whose apprehension the epistle denies. We can state clearly what the sources allow us to understand without claiming that they have already proved more. Readers who wish to examine each proposal and its supporting evidence will find them in the companion Research Edition.

Eight central sources for further reading

The sources follow a learning sequence: Tanya itself, then explanation and expansion, and finally the background in Pardes Rimonim.

1. Tanya, Chapter 39 and its accompanying note. Provides background on the standing of angels in Yetzirah and Beriah, and helps explain why they should not be identified with the sefirot of Atzilut.

2. Tanya, Iggeret HaKodesh 19. Explains Moses' apprehension of the pnimiyut of NeHYM and the terms panim and achorayim, making it essential to understanding the first difficulty.

3. Tanya, Iggeret HaKodesh 20. The source of both questions and the overall framework: the unity of the vessels, Moses' apprehension, and the distinction between hishtalshelut and creation.

4. Shiurim BeSefer HaTanya, Epistle 20. Explains the sequence of the argument and includes notes by the Rebbe, which should be read separately from the commentator's words.

5. Torah Or, Megillat Esther, "Yavi'u Levush Malchut" and its explanation. Explains the difference between the animal's soul proceeding from its source and the coming into being of its physical body.

6. Chana Ariel, Behaalotecha, "Veha'asafsuf". Describes Moses' prophecy within Atzilut, the partzuf of NeHY that remains beli mah, and the recipient's bitul.

7. Chana Ariel, Naso, "Veyishalchu Min HaMachaneh". Adds the description of Moses' apprehension as an image of the beli mah of the vessels of Atzilut.

8. Pardes Rimonim, Gate 6, Chapters 3 and 6. Provides background on the relationship between cause and effect and the limits of prophetic apprehension, while requiring care before equating every detail of its account with the wording of Tanya.